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American Corporate Governance and
Globalization
Steven A. Ramirez*
Recently, major flaws in the legal framework governing globalization have
become apparent.' Indeed, it is fair to say that the market fundamentalism approach
to globalization is under siege.2 The whirlwind of criticisms launched against the
neo-liberal model 3 of freer trade has recently boiled over from academic circles into
trade negotiations, which have fueled globalization since World War 1I. 4 The very
process of further globalization now seems in doubt. 5 This article will demonstrate
that the flawed market fundamentalism model of globalization has its roots in the

Loyola University Chicago School of Law. sramir3@luc.edu
1. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS XIII (2002) (stating
that decisions regarding international trade "were made on the basis of what seemed like a curious blend
of ideology and bad economics, dogma that sometimes seemed to be thinly veiling special interests" and
that the "most fundamental change that is required to make globalization work . . . is a change in
governance" at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade
Organization (WTO)). Joseph Stiglitz is the former Chief Economist of the World Bank and a Nobel
Laureate in economics.
See also Steven A. Ramirez, Market Fundamentalism's New Fiasco:
Globalization as Exhibit B in the Case for a New Law & Economics, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 831, 833, 837
(2003) (reviewing GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002)). Within economics there is some
controversy over some of Stiglitz's policy prescriptions; nevertheless, the key point he makes, that
economic growth requires economic and legal infrastructure beyond free markets alone, is broadly in
accordance with mainstream economic science. Id. at 849-52. Moreover, there is little controversy that
the international financial institutions have in the past failed to impound this central lesson from economic
science into their policymaking. Id.
2. The term "market fundamentalism" is used in this article to denote "the religious-like
certitude of those who believe in the moral superiority of organizing all dimensions of social life
according to market principles." See Margaret R. Somers & Fred Block, From Poverty to Perversity:
Ideas, Markets, and Institutions over 200 Years of Welfare Debate, 70 AM. Socio. REV. 260, 260-61
(2005) ("Social Scientists have been surprised by the extraordinary revival of market fundamentalism,
which was widely assumed to have died off in the Great Depression of the 1930s."). In terms of
globalization, market fundamentalism means minimal governmental interference with markets, lowering
trade barriers immediately with no allowance for transition costs, capital market liberalization worldwide,
and immediate privatization of all state industries. See also Ramirez, Market Fundamentalism's New
Fiasco: Globalization as Exhibit B in the Case for a New Law & Economics, supra note 1, at 835.
According to Stiglitz, this approach fails "to take on board the lessons of economic science" which teaches
that "a more balanced view of the role of government" is needed. See also STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 250.
3. 1use the terms neo-liberal, laissez-faire, and market fundamentalism interchangeably. Each
is based upon the idea that free markets work perfectly and there is therefore no need for government. See
STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 74. This approach is also referred to as neoclassical economics.
4. One of the most vociferous opponents of market fundamentalism is George Soros, who has
made billions from exploiting the current global economic regime.
See GEORGE SOROS, ON
GLOBALIZATION 178-79 (2002) (stating that market fundamentalism "is a perversion of human nature").
5. The Future of Globalization, ECONOMIST, July 29, 2006, at Il (stating that the recent
breakdown in the Doha round of trade negotiations was a "debacle" that threatens "to corrode the trading
system as a whole").
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flawed model of CEO primacy that dominates American corporate governance. 6 To
be more precise, globalization has followed the precise path that CEOs seeking the
greatest immediate self-enrichment would desire-that is the maximum exploitation
of cheap labor worldwide.' This article will also show that CEOs of transnational
corporations have decisive control over the course of globalization, and they have8
exercised their power in accordance with their own immediate self-interest.
Therefore, those interested in reforming globalization must first understand
American corporate governance.
In reality, neither economic growth nor free market ideology drive the
current approach to free trade. Instead, the current approach to free trade seems to be
driven by the push for higher CEO compensation. 9 If the current approach were
about free market ideology, then people would be empowered to move, just as jobs
move from nation to nation in search of the lowest wages.' 0 If it were about
economic growth then there would be significant funds available to build economic
infrastructure (especially human infrastructure) in less developed parts of the
world."1 Ironically, other approaches to free trade, such as the European Union
approach, embrace these elements, and have proven to be sustainable and

6. CEOs of public companies are the new potentates of the global economic order. For
example, I have previously shown that CEOs control the selection of their nominal superiors, the board of
directors, and they game this process to achieve homosocial reproduction at the board level, resulting in
higher CEO compensation. Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory:
Why Diversity Lags in America's Boardrooms and What to do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583
(2004).
7. See JEFF FAUX, GLOBAL CLASS WAR 137 (2006) (stating that globalization as presently
constructed operates to secure the "prime economic objective of keeping wages as low as possible").
8. The most recent example of the powers of a CEO in a U.S. publicly traded corporation is a
brewing options scandal involving the use of backdated option grants that would permit the grantee to take
advantage of lower past stock trading prices, often guaranteeing higher profits for the grantee. In one
case, the SEC appears to be contemplating charging the entire board compensation committee, composed
exclusively of outside directors, with fraud for permitting management to take advantage of backdated
grants. Eric Dash, Who Signed Off On Those Options?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, § 3, at 1.
9. In 2004 and 2005, CEO compensation at large American corporations continued to reach
ever increasing heights. Gary Strauss & Barbara Hanson, CEO Pay Soars in 2005 as a Select Group
Break the $100 Million Mark, USA TODAY, Apr. 11, 2006, at I B (stating that compensation for CEOs at
America's largest 100 corporations soared 25 percent in 2005 and 25 percent in 2004), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2006-04-09-ceo-compensation-report-x.htm.
10. See Steven A. Ramirez, Race as Misdirection: The Economic Stakes of Immigration from
Mexico Versus "Free Trade" with China and India (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
("Free market ideology stops with the free movement of people of color because of racism and the need of
those with power to keep cheap labor from moving to high cost locales.").
11. See, e.g., DAVID ROMER, ADVANCED MACROECONOMICS 100, 138-66 (3rd ed. 2006)
(finding that cross country differences in economic performance are due to differences in physical capital,
human capital, and social infrastructure); see also Robert E. Hall & Charles 1. Jones, Why Do Some
Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?, 114 Q. J. ECON. 83, 95 (1999)
(finding that output is influenced by investment in physical capital, human capital, and social
infrastructure which consists of government action that encourages people to undertake productive
activities). For an overview of the endogenous factors associated with macroeconomic growth, see Steven
A. Ramirez, Endogenous Growth Theory, Status Quo Efficiency and Globalization, 17 BERKELEY LA
RAZA L. J. 1, 1-2 (2006) ( "Nations that build human capital, reduce economically corrosive inequality,
and build institutions to support the exploitation of human ingenuity, outgrow those that neglect these
props to free market capitalism."). See also STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, TAKING ECONOMIC RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(forthcoming 2007).
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successful. 12 Instead, the American approach is simply to allow transnational
corporations to achieve greater profitability by exploiting the cheapest labor
worldwide, and freeing them from regulatory burdens such as environmental and
labor standards.' 3 This approach is not sustainable and will ultimately prove highly
unsuccessful, because the raw exploitation of cheap labor inherently destroys buying
power and does not develop human capital in a way that maximizes long term
growth.' 4 However, it is the foreseeable outcome of a CEO primacy system of
corporate governance, because such a system will encourage CEOs to maximize
their compensation today at the expense of long term corporate performance. 5
Part I of this article will review the mounting criticism of the market
fundamentalism approach to globalization by demonstrating the precise contours of
the flaws of such an approach. Part II will show the flaws plaguing American
corporate governance, which lead to an excessive, even myopic focus on short term
performance. Part III will show that these flaws in American corporate governance
have resulted in a flawed approach to globalization, which favors short term profits
while sacrificing long term growth. The article concludes that those interested in
reforming globalization should think about the role of American corporate
governance in generating the problems associated with globalization. Further, while
free markets may well be a powerful means of achieving economic development,
poverty reduction, and increased standards of living worldwide, they may also be
subverted by the power of elites (such as CEOs of transnational corporations) to
entrench themselves at the expense of economic performance
and social justice,
16
simultaneously, if legal infrastructure is lacking or is distorted.

I.

MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM'S FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS

Free market capitalism is certainly the backbone of every successful

12. FAUX, supranote 7, at 222-26.
13. Id.
14. Over a period of 20 years the U.S. went from the largest creditor nation to the largest
debtor nation. External debt now totals 25 percent of GDP and is on track to total 40 percent by 2008.
This is on par with Argentina's debt levels prior to its financial meltdown in 2001. FAUX, supra note 7, at
192. Thus, "the basic laws of economics will demand that the U.S. trade balance will eventually be
reversed and that this will cause a great deal of economic pain." Id. at 197. This imbalance, which is the
direct result of the destruction of buying power implicit in a globalization focused solely upon the
exploitation of cheap labor, has caused some experts to conclude that financial "Armageddon" threatens
the global economy. Id. at 194 (quoting Morgan Stanley chief economist Stephen Roach). Former Chair
of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker estimates a 75 percent chance of an economic crisis. Id. Warren
Buffet suggests that the increased debt of Americans threatens to transform the U.S. into a "sharecropper
society." Id.
15. The problem of corporate myopia is a well debated issue facing American corporate law,
which transcends the issues discussed in this article and touches upon a range of issues from the capital
structure of corporations to tax policy. In fact, even corporate CEOs themselves think that corporate
myopia is impairing long term performance of American companies and support policy reforms to stem
this dynamic. See James M. Poterba & Lawrence H. Summers, A CEO Survey of U.S. Companies' Time
Horizons and Hurdle Rates, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Fall 1995, at 43-53. See also Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient
Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms, 104 Q, J. ECON. 655 (1989) (suggesting that CEOs may behave
myopically in order to enhance their reputation for producing profits and to influence stock prices).
16. See RAGURHAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE
CAPITALISTS 312 (2003) (noting that capitalism "easily degenerates into a system of the incumbents, by
the incumbents and for incumbents").
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economy, especially when compared to the dismal economic record of centrally
planned communist countries. 17 However, every developed economy has benefited
from key government interventions to facilitate economic growth and stability. 8
Indeed, it is fair to say that no society would risk real market fundamentalism
voluntarily. 19 Market fundamentalism strips governments of the power to develop
their human resources to their full economic potential. 20 Developed countries, like
the U.S., have long subsidized human capital formation, albeit unevenly. 2 1 Market
fundamentalism also means that governments cannot act as investors of last resort, a
role even Adam Smith recognized.22 Market fundamentalism prevents governments

17. Of course, the foundation of any successful economy must be free markets, as a matter of
historical fact. ROMER, supra note 11, at 147 (comparing economic performance between communist East
Germany and North Korea versus free market South Korea and West Germany and concluding that
"market-oriented regimes were dramatically more successful economically than the communist ones").
"Capitalism, or more precisely the free market system, is the most effective way to organize production
and distribution that human beings have found." RAJAN & ZINGALES, supranote 16, at 1.
18. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL 14-22 (2005)
(stating that "not one successful developing country has pursued a purely free market approach to
development" and that Japan and other East Asian nations invested in physical and human capital and
shared growth widely leading to reduced inequality and poverty). Most recently, China and India have
grown at unprecedented rates, each under the watch of an interventionist state. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE
WIND OF THE HUNDRED DAYS: How WASHINGTON MISMANAGED GLOBALIZATION 357-58 (2000) (noting
that growth in India was accompanied by government policies fostering education, land reform,
community development, and health care); CHRIS BRAMALL, SOURCES OF CHINESE ECONOMIC GROWTH:
1978-1996, at 17, 470 (2000) (finding that China's experience suggests a role for "selective
interventionism" which underpinned growth of real GDP from 1978 to 1996 of nearly 10 percent per
annum); Yan Wang & Yudong Wao, Sources of Chinese Economic Growth 1952-1999: Incorporating
Human Capital Accumulation, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 32, 34, 47 (2003) (stating that human capital
accumulation was "quite rapid" in China).
19. Somers, supra note 2, at 261.
20. Human capital development is a key element of macroeconomic growth. SERGE
COULOMBE, JEAN FRANCOIS TREMBLAY, & SYLVIE MARCHAND, LITERACY SCORES, HUMAN CAPITAL

AND GROWTH ACROSS FOURTEEN OECD COUNTRIES 31 (2004) ("A country that achieves literacy scores

one percent higher than average ends up . . . with labor productivity and GDP per capita respectively
higher by 2.5 and 1.5 percent on average."), available at http://www.nald.ca/fulltext/oecd/oecd.pdf;
Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong & Mark Wilson, Health Human Capital and Economic Growth in SubSaharan Africa and OECD Countries, 44 Q. REV. ECON & FIN. 296 (2004) (finding that health capital
accounts for about 22 to 30 percent of economic growth and that increasing life expectance by one year
may raise economic growth by up to 4 percent per annum). It may be that economic studies have been
underestimating the positive influence of human capital development initiative on economic growth.
Angela de la Fuente & Rafael Domenech, Human Capital in Growth Regressions: How Much Difference
Does Data Quality Make?, 4 J. EURO. ECON. ASSOC. 1 (2006) (finding that refined data sets yields a
stronger correlation between human capital stock and economic growth, meaning prior studies may be
underestimating the influence of human capital investments).
21. For example, the U.S. after World War 11,responded to the compelling political pressure
to facilitate the re-integration of GIs into the American economy, and invested in human capital to an
extent never seen before or after. This massive investment paid economic benefits that were seven to 12
times the cost of the program. Staff Report, Subcommittee on Education and Health, Joint Economic
Committee, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Government Investment in Post-Secondary Education Under the
World War I1GI Bill, at 1 (Dec. 14, 1988) (unpublished report, on file with author).
22. Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MARYLAND
L. REV. 515, 553 (2003) (stating that "In 1776, Adam Smith wrote that among the duties of the sovereign
is the establishment and maintenance of 'public works,' which though they may be most advantageous to
society, are however, of such a nature that 'the profit could never repay the expense to any one
individual"') (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 244 (Edwin Cannan ed., The Univ. of Chi.
Press 1976) (1776)).
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from pursuing the kind of economic planning that has been associated with
successful economies.23 Finally, market fundamentalism negates the government's
ability to deal with the inherent volatility caused by the psychological factors
underlying market economies, and the investment function in particular.2 4 This is
why mainstream economic science deems market fundamentalism discredited and
based more in political ideology than economics. 25 In fact, market fundamentalism
can only be termed pseudo-economics, rather than economic science; market
fundamentalism is an economic dead end.26
In terms of globalization this form of pseudo-economics manifested itself in
four ways: rapid privatization of state industries; capital market liberalization; rapid
elimination or severe reduction of trade barriers; and an extremely austere role for
government interventions. 2' But globalization also bears the mark of market
fundamentalism by the absence of key elements necessary to economic growth.
Globalization as presently constructed does little to secure the rational development
of human capital.28 There is little provision for the development or preservation of
consumer buying power. 29 There are no central economic institutions to coordinate

23. In the U.S., for example, "markets were not left to develop willy-nilly on their own;
government played a vital role in shaping the evolution of the economy." STIGLITZ, supra note 1,at 21.
In addition to the U.S., neither Japan nor Europe followed a market fundamentalism approach to economic
success. Id. at 16-17. The East Asian success stories also occurred "in spite of' the policy prescriptions
of market fundamentalism. Id. at 91 (citing THE WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993)).
24. Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of Investor Confidence, 42 WASHBURN
L.J. 31 (2002) (demonstrating that optimized regulatory infrastructure designed to strengthen investor
confidence stabilizes and enhances macroeconomic performance).
25. STIGLITZ, supra note 1,at 74 (stating that after the Great Depression laissez faire policies
were "widely rejected"). Stiglitz asserts that market fundamentalism arises from "curious blend of
ideology and bad economics" and "dogma that seemed to be thinly veiling special interests." Id. at xiii.
26. Much of the evidence emerging on the dynamics of economic growth is the outcome of
endogenous growth theory. Endogenous growth theory is premised on the idea that "innovations do not
fall like manna from heaven" but instead are the result of incentives to innovate. Economists now study
the role of market imperfections in inhibiting innovation and government policies in creating the right
incentives for unleashing human ingenuity. They have found that "innovations are created by human
beings, operating under the normal range of human motivations" as mediated by "laws, institutions,
customs, and regulations." PHILIPPE AGHION & PETER Howtrr, ENDOGENOUS GROWTH THEORY 1
(1999). Prior to endogenous growth theory, innovation was exogenous to economic growth models. Id. at
3. One imperfection that plagues all markets is asymmetric information which occurs whenever market
participants do not have perfect information. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1,at 219 (stating that because all
markets suffer from imperfect information there are theoretically always possible government
interventions which can enhance outcomes). Professor Stiglitz teaches that economic science requires that
policymakers take a balanced view of the appropriate role for both markets and government. Id. at 250.
27. Ramirez, Race as Misdirection. supranote 10.
28. Supra text accompanying note 17. Inequality in access to educational opportunity is
harmful to economic growth, as opportunities are allocated based upon privilege instead of merit. Ampro
Castello & Rafael Domenech, Human CapitalInequality and Economic Growth: Some New Evidence, 112
ECON. J.C187, C188-89 (2002) ("human capital inequality measures provide more robust results than
income inequality measures in growth regressions").
29. In fact, in the United States the government has long supported consumer buying power,
in light of the collapse of consumption during the Great Depression. See FAUX, supra note 7, at 78-80
(recounting how elites realized that preservation of buying power was essential to macroeconomic
success). See also Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal, supra note 18, at 546-61
(showing how the New Deal secured consumer buying power in order to enhance macroeconomic
performance).
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global fiscal or monetary policy. 30 Market fundamentalism has also operated to
assure that destructive regulatory competition takes hold to free transnational
corporations from basic regulatory schemes such as environmental and labor
standards.3' In short, the global economy is founded upon laissez faire economics,
discredited for their inability to sustain long term economic growth.
The one free market ideal that seems not to be on the agenda of
globalization is quite telling: there is little provision for the free movement of
people. 32 The free movement of people would allow migration to wherever wages
would be the highest, in accordance with free market precepts.33 Economists
conclude that barriers to the free movement of people are costing the world economy
70 percent of world GDP in forgone OUtput. 34 Instead, jobs are permitted to move to
the lowest wage locale, but people are essentially stranded in low wage nations. 35
Simple supply and demand suggests that prohibiting the free movement of people
from low wage locales to high wage locales while allowing the free movement of
jobs into low wage countries would suppress wages throughout the global
economy.36 One early study found that if labor were free to move around the world
until wages equalized between developed and developing nations, global output

30. The closest international agencies to any kind of monetary or fiscal authority are the IMF
and the World Bank. However, neither engages in counter-cyclical monetary or fiscal policy. Instead the
IMF merely responds to any currency crisis that a nation may suffer and the World Bank simply makes
development loans. See Ramirez, Market Fundamentalism'sNew Fiasco,supra note 1, at 852.
31. Unfortunately, today it is "easy for employers to avoid American labor laws, unions,
collective bargaining agreements, and labor standards. American unions lack the bargaining power to
protect American workers from competing with foreign labor in a race to the bottom that eventually will
harm the entire global labor market and the American economy." Gail Frommer, Hooray... for Toronto?
Hollywood, Collective Bargainingand ExtraterritorialUnion Rules in an Era of Globalization, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 55, 119-20 (2003). The same race to the bottom dynamic threatens human rights. See
Frank Garcia, Trading Away the Human Rights Principle, 29 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 51, 87 (1999)
("Market globalization, in its institutional and regulatory form as the international economic law of today,
could mean the triumph of utilitarian approaches to values over deontological ones, and therefore the
triumph of trade over human rights.").
32. STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 18, at 247 (stating that little progress has been made in
permitting the free movement of labor-except with respect to business executives-even though the
"movement of less skilled workers from developing countries (where they are in oversupply) to developed
countries (where they are in undersupply) is estimated to increase world welfare by hundreds of billions of
dollars").
33. NIGEL HARRIS, THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE 9 (2002) (stating that free movement of
people is "intrinsic" to a market economy).
34. STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 18, at 250 (collecting and summarizing studies).
35. See Allen S. Blinder, Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Mar./Apr. 2006, at 113, 120, 122 (predicting that between 28 million and 42 million "impersonal" service
jobs may be offshored from the U.S. to the far east in the "electronic future").
36. See Stephen Greenhouse & David Leonhardt, Real Wages Fail to Match a Rise in
Productivity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006, at I (stating "[a]s a result, wages and salaries now make up the
lowest share of the nation's gross domestic product since the government began recording the data in
1947, while corporate profits have climbed to their highest share since the 1960's ...[h]owever, "at the
very top of the income spectrum, many workers have continued to receive raises that outpace inflation,
and the gains have been large enough to keep average income and consumer spending rising" Id. Now,
economists and policymakers are concerned that workers are losing bargaining power and the benefits of
globalization are not being widely shared. Id. Indeed, total employee compensation is at a 40 year low as
a percentage ofGDP. Id. Meanwhile, "[t]he most important contributor to higher profit margins over the
past five years has been a decline in labor's share of national income." Id.
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would more than double.37 Free market ideology has proven powerless to materially
reduce the barriers that people face if they desire to migrate to higher wage nations,
such as the United States.38 Hence the anomalous structure of globalization - free
movement ofjobs, highly restricted movement of labor.
The barriers to the movement of labor illustrate the principles guiding the
Anything that fattens the profits of transnational
course of globalization.
corporations over the short term is at the top of the agenda, and anything that
requires short term expenditures in the name of long term profits is relegated to the
back burner at best. Thus, the entire fagade of globalization appears aimed at
securing "the divine right of multinational corporations to have access to the world's
cheap labor" and to short term profitability. 39 Rapid privatization opens
opportunities for financial services companies and banks to participate in highly
profitable transactions right now, with little regard to any harm done to the domestic
economy at issue.4° Capital market liberalization allows those same sectors to profit
from increased capital flows around the world, with little concern for the instability
wrought by such flows, not to mention the risks faced by developing nations from
exposing their currencies to speculative attack. 4 1 Trade barrier reductions allow
transnational corporations to move factories to nations with lower wages without any
42
These
concern for the resulting destruction of local consumer buying power.
elements generate revenue today with no additional expense to transnational
corporations.
On the other hand, human capital development requires expenditures now
for long term benefits-and generally entails increased taxes. Consequently, there is
no provision for securing basic economic human rights despite the macroeconomic
payoffs from such investments in human capital.43 Developing basic economic
infrastructure similarly requires a sacrifice of profits today in the form of taxation,
for profits tomorrow.44 For example, protecting the environment, which like any

37. Bob Hamilton & John Whalley, Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global
Restrictions on Labour Mobility: Calculationsand Policy Implications, 14 J. DEV. ECON. 61,70 (1984).
38. Indeed, if the 20th century is the century of the triumph of free markets, it is also the
century that ushered in the creation and expansion of barriers on the free movement of people. HARRIS,
supra note 33, at 9-12.
39. FAUX, supranote 7, at 195.
40. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 157-60 (discussing how Russian privatization program
harmed the Russian economy).
41. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 63-64. (stating capital market liberalization may not have
contributed to global economic stability, but it did open up vast new markets for Wall Street). See also
Ramirez, Market Fundamentalism's New Fiasco, supra note 1, at 841 (collecting authorities regarding
capital market volatility).
42. See supra text accompanying notes 11, 18, 20, & 28.
43. Ramirez, Taking Economic Human Rights Seriously, supra note II (showing that
economic human rights are broadly consistent with the economic science of growth, yet suffer from a
virtual absence of enforcement mechanisms).
44. 1 have previously argued that government investment is typically plagued by special
interest distortion, and it would be beneficial if corporations were more inclined to exploit mass
investment opportunities. Steven A. Ramirez, Rethinking the Corporation (and Race) in America: Can
Law (and Professionalization) Fix "Minor" Problems of Externalization, Internalization, and
Governance?, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 977, 988-89 (2005). Nevertheless, government has also enjoyed
stunning success in acting as the economy's investor of last resort, by undertaking such hugely successful
investments as the GI Bill or the interstate highway system. Id. at 989. It may well be that maximizing
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economic resource should be wisely conserved, means sacrificing profits today for
sustainable profitability into the future.45 Preserving buying power would require
paying higher wages to laborers, which may only make sense if the long term is
considered.46 And, allowing people to move from low wage nations to high wage
nations would raise wages globally and impact profits adversely today. 47 Taken
together, these measures would require sacrificing short term profits in favor of long
term growth. However, American globalization almost exclusively favors the short
term while the long term is left to fend for itself.
Economic science and even economic ideology fail to explain the course of
globalization. Globalization is designed to maximize short term profits only, and
long term economic success is sacrificed on the altar of quarterly profit reports.48
This approach generates huge costs and risks, which are inevitably borne by the
general public. 49 The risks of global macroeconomic instability affect all global
citizens, yet they do not appear to be a major concern to those with power over
globalization. 50
Slower global economic growth also has widely diffused
consequences. 51 Extreme poverty will erode the ability of many market participants
to achieve the highest profits possible over
the long term, but long term prevention
52
means incurring costs in the short term.

the benefits from government investment in infrastructure requires a depoliticized agency, like the Federal
Reserve Board. See Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing FinancialRegulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
503, 553 (2000) ("The historical and empirical record suggests that the Fed has not exercised its power
over monetary policy for the benefit of special interests.").
45. Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law,
43 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2001) (stating that law must consider issues of ecological sustainability as part of the
macroeconomic analysis of law).
46. Of course in the face of a crisis, elites will act to prop up buying power. See supra note
26.
47. Ramirez, Race as Misdirection, supra note 10.
48. The problem of corporate myopia-an excessive focus on short term results over long
term performance-is an issue that has long been studied. It appears to have many dimensions ranging
from tax policy to employee training. Thomas J. Chemmanur & S. Abraham Ravid, Asymmetric
Information, Corporate Myopia, and Capital Gains Tax Rates: An Analysis of Tax Rates, 8 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 205, 206 (1999). This article does not seek to offer corporate governance as the
exclusive cause of corporate myopia; instead this article seeks merely to identify corporate governance as
one prime contributor to corporate myopia in the specific context of globalization.
49. See supratext accompanying notes 14, 36 & 41.
50. In fact, Jeff Faux contends that the present approach to globalization maximizes the profits
enjoyed by a narrow transnational elite while exposing the mass of labor to a "brutal and merciless...
global market." FAUX, supra note 7, at 3. Faux further contends that this lack of care for their fellow
nationals is based upon "social distance" and "class solidarity." Id. at 1. Thus, patent risks of a crisis of
buying power caused by offshoring and a concentration of consumption in a debt ridden U.S. are largely
ignored. See supra notes 14 & 36.
51. It is possible that the transnational elite have not only divorced themselves from the wellbeing of any particular nation-state, as Faux posits, but, paradoxically, have also divorced themselves
from the well-being of the global economy as a whole. For even if the global economy slows down there
may well be pockets of boom for capital to earn extraordinary profits. Thus, if oil prices go up, there are
capital flows from the Middle East to exploit for profit. Similarly, if Russia collapses in 1998, then when
it revives capital can return and revert to earning returns not available in other nations. Jenny Davey, No
Sign of an End to Mergers Boom Says Goldman Chief TIMES ONLINE, Apr. 27, 2006 (quoting the co-CEO
of Goldman Sachs International, Scott B. Kapnick), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,52153175,00.html.
52. Over 2.8 billion people struggle to live on less than two dollars per day. Ramirez, Market
Fundamentalism 's New Fiasco, supra note 1, at 831 n. 1.

HeinOnline -- 18 Berkeley La Raza L.J. 54 2007

AMERICAN CORPORA TE GOVERNANCE AND GLOBALIZA TION

2007]

In other words, while market fundamentalism may provide the aura of
ideological legitimacy, and economic growth provides excellent political rhetoric,
the structure of globalization is best explained by short term versus long term
payoffs. 3 The short term payoff trumps the long term payoff, in defiance of any
measure of economic rationality.
Why? After all, the dominant economic institution, on a global basis, is the
corporation. I have previously termed the corporation as a candidate for one of the
most powerful legal innovations in history.54 It has an infinite investment horizon,
thanks to perpetual existence.55 It benefits from limited liability which reduces
investor risks and lowers the cost of capital.56 Its shareholder primacy ideal and its
ability to lock in capital similarly operates to facilitate the flow of capital from
passive investors into entrepreneurial activity. 57 This institutional design should
operate to create a powerful institutional context for exploitation of long term
investment opportunities even at the expense of short term costs. 58 This in turn
should create political pressure for an optimized globalization legal structure.
Nevertheless, the American corporation is ill. Specifically, because the law
of corporate governance has transmogrified into a CEO primacy model, the public
corporation in America is dysfunctional. 59 The next section seeks to explain this
development in order to show that CEOs had both the motive and the opportunity to
subvert globalization for their own benefit. The motive was higher compensation.
The opportunity was CEO control over the public corporation unfettered by law
except in egregious circumstances.

II.

AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CEO PRIMACY

CEOs of public companies have the unique privilege of picking their own
nominal supervisors-the board of directors.60 Under the federal proxy rules
(applicable to all publicly traded corporations) only management (i.e., the CEO) has
the power to use corporate funds to solicit proxy votes for their slate of director

53. See supra notes 37-52. See also THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005)
(extolling the virtues of globalization as presently configured because it will force all to compete on equal
footing). But see Paul Krugman, Graduates versus Oligarchs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, at Al
(demonstrating that while the vast majority of American workers saw wages stagnate from 1972 and 2001,
the income of those in the 99.99 percentile rose by 467 percent). Apparently, only I in 10,000 Americans
can compete effectively in Friedman's flat world.
54. Ramirez, Rethinking the Corporation(and Race) in America, supra note 44, at 979.
55. Id. at 984.
56. Id. at 983-84.
57. Id. at 978-79.
58. 1have previously termed the corporation as "rightfully" a candidate for the greatest single
invention of modem times. Id. at 979.
59. JOHN BOGLE, THE BATIrLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 28 (2005) (stating that a
"pathological mutation" has gripped corporate governance as owners' capitalism has become managers'
capitalism and executive compensation soared resulting in the transfer of trillions in wealth from
shareholders to CEOs and other insiders). See also Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, 45
WASHBURN L. J. 343, 344, 344 n.10 (2006) (tracing emergence of CEO primacy in corporate governance
law).
60. "The CEO typically holds ultimate control over management and decisive control over the
selection of directors." Ramirez, Rethinking the Corporation (and Race) in America, supra note 44, at
982 n.24.
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candidates. 61 As Professor Tom Joo has demonstrated, even if a shareholder mounts
a proxy challenge, there are rules that systematically favor the interests of
management.62 If a mere shareholder wishes to place a person on the board, the
shareholder must absorb printing costs, postage costs, and legal costs of mounting a
full blown proxy solicitation, and these costs can amount to hundreds of millions of
dollars.63 Thus, there is typically only one candidate for a board position in public
corporations, and that candidate is selected by management. 64 This means that the
CEO may stack the board with cultural and social clones in order to maximize
compensation.65 Shareholder democracy is a myth in the U.S., and management
interests have worked to keep it a myth.66
Further, these handpicked supervisors essentially have no duty of care to
monitor management. 67 Case law holding directors liable for breach of their socalled duty of care is rare.68 Moreover, state legislatures have seen fit to add
additional insulation to that which prevailed at common law.69 Specifically, under

61. See 17 CFR 240.14a (8)(i)(8)(2006).
62. Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of "Corporate Democracy": Shareholder
Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 735 (2003). Professor Joo identifies the
following impediments to shareholder voting power: federal proxy rules that prohibit inclusion of
shareholder proposals relating to board membership within management's proxy, meaning dissident
shareholders must bear the steep costs of their own proxy challenge; and authorization of brokers to vote
shares within client accounts-invariably voting with management-unless they receive contrary
instructions. Id. at 758-60.
63. Id. In addition, the management may spend corporate funds to resist shareholder
proposals. Designed by Committee, ECONOMIST, June 15, 2002, at 71 (recounting a proxy contest at
Hewlett-Packard in which the company spent $150 million to fend off a proxy challenge brought by the
son of a company founder, Walter Hewlett).
64. Id. ("The CEO puts up the candidates, no one runs against them and management counts
the votes.") (quoting shareholder activist Nell Minow of the Corporate Library). One commentator has
stated that the incidence of electoral challenges to incumbent management is extremely rare and that the
incidence of successful challenges is practically negligible. LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK, THE MYTH OF THE
SHAREHOLDER
FRANCHISE, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Oct. 2005, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=829804. Walter Hewlett, for example, lost his challenge, despite having the
prodigious advantages of a board seat and being heir to a founder. Steve Lohr, Suit Against Hewlett Deal
is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at C5.
65. Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity
Lags in America's Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1613 (2004)
(concluding that "CEOs play the game of homosocial reproduction when selecting directors").
66. Recently, management interests have trumped the SEC's efforts to break the stranglehold
that management has over the proxy machinery and therefore voting power within the public corporation.
Andrew Parker, It Is Time for a Transfer of Power, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 4, 2005, at 10 (stating that
ferocious opposition from corporate CEOs had stifled proxy reform, leading to management power over
the director selection process and higher compensation).
67. Marc 1. Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42 Sw L. J. 919 (1988). See
Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, supra note 59, at 364.
68. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095-96 (1968) (citing numerous authorities).
Indeed, Professor Bishop cites only four "recent" cases in which directors were held answerable for
negligence. Id. at 1099-2001. One notable modem case that imposed liability on outside directors is
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Between 1980 and 2005, Smith stands as the only
example of outside directors being found liable and paying damages. Bernard Black et al., Outside
DirectorLiability, 58 STANFORD L. REV. 1065 (2006) (studying actual out-of-pocket liability rather than
nominal liability).
69. James J. Hanks, Jr., EvaluatingRecent State Legislation on Directorand Officer Liability
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1210 (1988) (stating that, between April 1986 and

HeinOnline -- 18 Berkeley La Raza L.J. 56 2007

2007]

AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND GLOBALIZATION

most state laws-including the key jurisdiction of Delaware where most public
corporations are incorporated-management may today insert a provision in the
corporate charter to eliminate duty of care liability altogether, so long as
70
shareholders approve under our mythological system of corporate democracy.
Professor Hamermesh has found that 98 percent of sampled Fortune 500 companies
have opted for such an insulating provision. 71 Thus, "over the past twenty years
there has been a virtual elimination of legal liability ... for directors who breach
their fiduciary duty of care.",72 So management not only gets to pick their
supervisors but it may insulate the board of directors from all liability for failing to
monitor management.
In addition, in 1995 and again in 1998, Congress eviscerated liability under
new federal securities laws, further insulating CEOs, corporate managers, and boards
of directors from legal obligations. In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act.13 This legislation "stacked the deck" against plaintiffs and
left private securities litigation in a "near terminal state. 74 In 1998, Congress cut
back management accountability further, by stripping investors of rights of action
under state law, insofar as class action relief is concerned, by enacting the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act. 75 For the first time ever, federal law operated to
restrict investor rights under state law, turning federal securities laws on their head.76
These so-called "reforms" of the federal securities laws came in response to massive
lobbying and campaign efforts by business interests to relieve themselves of ever
more legal obligations to shareholders and investors.77 These business interests have
found themselves further coddled by the Supreme Court, which seems determined to
eliminate investor remedies at every tum.78 Managers now have little to fear insofar

the middle of 1988, forty states responded to the application of gross negligence articulated by Smith with
legislation aimed at reducing the risk of director liability for duty-of-care violations).
70. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Meaningful shareholder consent in
this context is an illusion given management's control of the proxy machinery process, the strong
inclination of institutional investors to vote with management, and the typical individual stockholder's
ignorance of corporate charter provisions. See Steinberg, supra note 67, at 927.
71. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Fiduciary Duty, Limited Liability, and the Law of Delaware:
Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477,490 (2000).
72. Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary
Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUSTON L. REv. 393, 394 (2005).
73. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2000)).
74. Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with
the Meritorious as well as the Frivolous,40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1059-60 (1999).
75. Pub. L. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified at various provisions of 15 U.S.C.).
76. Ramirez, Arbitration,supranote 74, at 1059 n. 13.
77. Ann Reilly Dowd, Look Who's Cashing in on Congress, MONEY, Dec. 1997, at 132
(listing the PSLRA as the top example of the relationship between laws, money, and lobbying, and noting
that PSLRA was backed by a $29.6 million war chest).
78. See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and Now
Often Fatal Journeyfor Plaintiffs in FederalSecurities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 3, 6 (1996-97)
("In forty federal securities law decisions, the Court decided thirty-two cases for defendants and, in almost
every one, significantly narrowed the reach of federal securities laws."). Most recently the Supreme Court
decided once again in favor of defendants, and gave the SLUSA an expansive preemptive sweep at the
expense of state autonomy and power to protect citizens from fraud. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
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as civil liability for securities fraud is concerned.79
All of this corporation-friendly law making manifests itself in ways that are
counterintuitive and difficult to predict. 80 For example, given the centrality of
information to the functioning of markets, one may be tempted to conclude that any
disclosure of corporate information is beneficial to the functioning of financial
markets and the corporation as an institution.81 However, empirical studies suggest
this theoretical supposition is flawed. 82 Instead, corporations providing frequent
earnings guidance seem inclined to forgo expenditures that yield long term profits in
order to inflate earnings over the short term. 83 Thus, in one recent study companies
that provided frequent earnings guidance were found to have spent less on research
and development than those companies that provided less guidance, and therefore to
have suffered stunted financial performance over the long term. 84 In short, it appears
that CEOs have both the motive (compensation) and opportunity (power) to forgo
long term financial performance in favor of short term profitability (and presumably
higher CEO pay), due in part to the flawed system of American corporate
governance.
Recent events illustrate just how weak American corporate governance
standards have become. In the summer of 2006, it became clear that thousands of
public corporations were backdating options grants to past dates when their stock
was trading lower to maximize payoffs to their senior executives. 85 While
backdating may not be illegal if both appropriately disclosed and done in accordance
with tax law, by the end of the summer, two criminal cases had been filed against
executives at Brocade Communications and Comverse Technology.86 Moreover,
over 100 companies disclosed that their options practices were under investigation

79. Black, supra note 68, at 1089 ("Our search produced no cases since 1980 in which outside
directors were held liable after trial under [the securities laws]").
80. Even before the 1990s, it was apparent that managers had successfully limited their
accountability under the law. See Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 95, 113-15 (2004) (asserting that lax state fiduciary duties contributed to "a dramatic increase in the
ratio of the compensation of the corporate CEO to that of the average corporate blue collar employee. In
1980, this ratio was 42 to 1 . . . by 2000, it was estimated to be at least 475 to 1."); Joel Seligman, The
Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REV. 947, 949 (1990) ("The most
distinctive aspect of the last decade in corporate law was the celerity with which traditional constraints on
corporate managers weakened.").
81. The Sounds of Silence, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2006, at 79-80 (noting that defenders of
corporate earnings guidance argue that disclosure of "more information is always better").
82. Mei Cheng, K.R. Subramanyam & Yuan Zhang, Earnings Guidance and Managerial
Myopia, Nov. 2005, http://papers.ssm.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=851545 (working paper on file
with author). This study involved a sample of 984 companies across 10 industries. Id. at 11.
83. Id. at 2 ("We find that . . . dedicated guiders spend significantly less on R&D than
occasional guiders, which suggests that earnings guidance is indeed associated with myopic behavior with
respect to R&D spending.").
84. Id. at 29 ("[W]e document that dedicated guiders invest less in R&D and have
significantly lower [return on assets] growth than occasional guiders.").
85. Stephanie Saul, Study Finds Backdating of Options Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2006 (reporting on an academic study finding "more than 2,000 companies appear to have used backdated
stock
options
to
sweeten
their
top
executives'
pay
packages"),
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/17/business/17options.html.
86. Phantom of the Options, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 2006, at 6, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/24/opinion/edoption.php.
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by the end of the summer."
Rigging options grants to maximize payoff to
executives by picking some low price point in the past as a fraudulent grant date is
"like stealing money from the company and shareholders." 88 It appears that this
occurred systematically over a period of ten years throughout corporate America.89
The mere existence of this practice at publicly traded companies suggests that
corporate governance is insufficient to balance CEO autonomy against the rights of
shareholders and maintain compliance with federal tax law.
A similar episode of excessive CEO autonomy erupted in late 2007 and
continues to threaten U.S. macroeconomic performance into 2008. CEOs enjoyed
sufficient autonomy to generate short term fee income at the expense of long term
risks in connection with subprime mortgages. 90 Thus, numerous commentators have
suggested that the subprime mortgage crisis stems from a broken system of corporate
governance that permits CEOs to enhance their compensation at the expense of the
long term well-being of the corporation. 9' The fact that CEOs can ignore the long
term interests of the corporation to enhance their own short term compensation
supports the central theme of this article: CEOs have similarly manipulated the
process of globalization in a way that results in maximum short term compensation
at the expense of long term economic stability.
In other words, CEOs enjoy nearly unfettered autonomy over America's
largest corporations. They select their nominal supervisors, have the ability to
routinely increase their pay at the expense of long-term profitability, and are largely
above the law in all but the most egregious circumstances.92 The next part of this
article will examine the implications of unchecked CEO autonomy in terms of
globalization.

III.

CEO PRIMACY AND DISPROPORTIONATE AMERICAN
CONTROL OF GLOBALIZATION

By all accounts, transnational corporations headquartered in the United
States and incorporated under the laws of the United States (usually Delaware) have
a decisive influence on the course of globalization and the legal framework

87. Id.
88. Carolyn Said, PossibleOptions Scams at Several Local Companies, S.F. CHRON., May 24,

2006, at C I(quoting compensation expert Fred Whittlesey).
89. Randall A. Herron & Eric Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock PricePattern Around
Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 294 (2007) ("We find evidence suggesting that

backdating is the major source of the abnormal stock return patterns around executive stock option
grants."). Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top Executives Have
Been Backdated or Manipulated?, at 1I, Nov. 1, 2006 (unpublished manuscript), http://
www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/Grants-I 1-01-2006.pdf.
90. See Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise Wide Risk Management and

CorporateGovernance, 39 LOYOLA U. CHI. L. J. (forthcoming 2008).
91. Id. (citing Raghuram Rajan, Bankers Pay is Deeply Flawed, FIN. TIMES 11, Jan. 9, 2008,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/18895dea-beO6-1Idc-8bc9-0000779fd2ac.html;
Paul Krugman,
Banks
Gone
Wild,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
23,
2007,
at
A-37,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/23/opinion/23krugman.html).

92. For an assessment of the shortcomings of the now harsher sanctions for criminal
misconduct, see Ramirez, Chaos, supra note 59, at 358.
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governing free trade.93 Section III will first consider the power of the United States
government over key institutional elements of the global economy-including the
IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.94 Next, the article will demonstrate that the
political context within the United States is such that globalization issues are
determined by transnational corporations and particularly the CEOs that govern
them. Finally, the article will show that as a result of this power structure and CEO
primacy over the corporation, globalization has been structured to serve the interests
of CEOs of transnational corporations.
With respect to the World Bank and the IMF, the United States has informal
power to select the head of the World Bank and essentially exercises veto power
over the IMF.95 Only the United States has this kind of effective veto over the
IMF.96 Moreover, the United States also has a high degree of leverage over both the
World Bank and the IMF as a result of its funding practices with regard to both of
these agencies.
Being the largest shareholder of these institutions, the United
States also has a high degree of informal power, as the IMF and the World Bank
rarely present any important recommendation without first consulting the United
States.98 "In sum, the United States has substantial influence over the mandates,
policies and modus operandi of [these] international financial institutions." 99 Thus,
when the U.S. Treasury pushed for market liberalization, the IMF pushed for market
liberalization. 00 "The IMF and the World Bank were part of Treasury's turf, an
arena which.., they were allowed to push their perspectives, just as other
departments, within their domains, could push theirs."''
With respect to the WTO, the United States enjoys disproportionate
bargaining power in negotiating trade agreements as a result of the size of its
consumer market. 0 2 The former chief economist of the World Bank, Nobel Laureate
Joseph Stiglitz suggests that "in practice the United States, Europe and Japan have

93. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 1,at 173-76 (recounting instance of special interest
influence being used by Alcoa CEO to induce U.S. government to participate in the creation of a global
aluminum cartel despite violation of U.S. antitrust laws).
94. The WTO administers the multilateral trading agreements that form the sine of
globalization. It has the power to define the rules of international trade, including the power to adjudicate
trade disputes in binding matter. See STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supranote 18, at xxvi.
95. STIGLITZ, supra note 1,at 12 & 19.
96. Id. at 12.
97. In sum, the financing of the IMF and World Bank has opened them up to U.S. influence..
•.Each time an increase in the IMF quotas or replenishment of the Bank's IDA has been negotiated, the
Congress has used the opportunity to threaten or withhold funds ....As a result ... the institutions have
grown used to placating not just the powerful Departments of State and Treasury, but also the feisty U.S.
Congress. 'The overall result seems to have enhanced the capacity of the United States unilaterally to
determine aspects of policy and structure within both the IMF and World Bank. Nagire Woods, The
United States and the InternationalFinancialInstitutions: Power and Influence Within the World Bank
and the IMF, in U.S. HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 93, 102 (Rosemary Foote et al.
eds., 2003).
98. Id. at 107.
99. Id. at 113.
100. STIGLITZ, supra note 1,at 102.
101. Id.at80.
102. Guatam Sen, The U.S. and the GATT/WTO System, in U.S. HEGEMONY AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 116-17 (Rosemary Foote etal. eds., 2003).
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dominated" the consensus-driven WTO process. 3 This is because if the United
States does not sign onto a given trade agreement, then the trade agreement is
effectively meaningless because of the size of the U.S. consumer market.'0 4 "The
U.S. enjoys an unspoken veto over the appointment of the director general of the
WTO and key staff."'' 5 Few countries also have the administrative infrastructure
and the resources that the United States can bring to bear in the context of any trade
dispute.'0 6 In addition, the United States uses the WTO accession process to exercise
its power in ways that extract additional concessions and to further its foreign policy
agenda.10 7 Thus, it is fair to say that the United States enjoys a high degree of
influence over the WTO.10 8
The power of the United States over these international financial
institutions, and therefore over virtually all aspects of globalization, is exercised
through the President, the Congress, the State Department, the Treasury Department,
the Commerce Department, the International Trade Commission, and the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative.' 0 9 Each of these entities responds to varied political
pressures, yet the power of transnational corporations predominates on virtually all
levels."0 Both the Commerce Department and the U.S. Trade Representative
formulate trade policy in conjunction with advisory committees that represent
industry." 1 Historically, the United States has had a significant sector of its
economy resist free trade. More recently however, U.S. based transnational
corporations and the U.S. financial services sector have been ascendant as more of
the nation's output is dependent upon free trade. 1 2 This has fueled the renewed
policy emphasis on trade liberalization."13
In the election of 1992, the ascendant power of transnational corporations
became manifest. Specifically, although President Bill Clinton campaigned on a
platform that included a balanced vision of globalization (complete with protections
for labor and environmental standards), the Clinton administration passed a vision of
free trade (the NAFTA Agreement) that was ultimately about the exploitation of
cheap labor and devoid of meaningful environmental and labor protections.' 14 When
NAFTA was signed into law it was in the presence of two Democratic Presidents
(Carter and Clinton) and two Republican Presidents (George H. W. Bush and
103. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 225-26.
104. See id.
105. Sen, supranote 102, at 131.
106. Id.
107. STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 18, at 159 & 165. See also Sen, supra note 102, at
131 (stating that the entry of China into the WTO was a "two level game, between the governments of
China and the U.S. and the U.S. President and Congress.").
108. The WTO is potentially the most powerful of the three international financial institutions.
The IMF and the World Bank are essentially limited to helping nations manage currency crises and to
granting development loans, respectively. Sen, supra note 102, at 115. The WTO on the other hand has
the power to adjudicate trade disputes that could bear on the domestic policies of member states. Id.
109. Woods, supranote 97, at 101-02; Sen, supra note 102, at 125.
110. For example, Treasury answers primarily to the financial community and Commerce
answers primarily to industrial concerns. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 63-64, 70, 173-76.
111. Sen, supra note 102, at 125.
112. Id. at 134-35.
113. Id.
114. FAUX, supra note 7, at 10-11 & 13.
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Ford)."1 5 Thereafter, there has been very little partisan bickering over the course of
globalization."l 6 Indeed, globalization was essentially a non-issue in the elections of
2000 and 2004."' Union power is at a low ebb 1 8 and globalization receives little
attention in mainstream political discourse."l 9 Thus, the0 present structure of
globalization is the product of a broad bi-partisan consensus.12
Given the grip of "globalization" on each political party and the mainstream
media, transnational corporations are firmly in control of the international trading
system. 12 1 I have argued in the past that globalization and the regulatory structure
122
governing its evolution is tailor made for the exercise of special interest influence.
Other commentators argue that given the large economic stakes of globalization, it
would be odd if special interest influence did not hold sway over the course of law in
this arena. 123 For purposes of this article, the point is that the issue of globalization
has effectively been removed from political discourse and left in the hands of a
transnational elite that is centered in the United States. 124 At the center stands the
CEO of the American public corporation, as the highest authority within the
corporation and largely unencumbered by supervision and legal restraint.
CEOs are generally highly focused on their compensation, and are willing
and able to sacrifice long term financial performance for short term profitability to
boost their salaries. 125 CEOs have been shown to sacrifice long term investments
such as research and development expenditures in order to post more impressive
quarterly earnings. 126 CEOs routinely select directors who are likely to raise their
compensation, even though more diverse boards post more impressive long term
results. 127 Jeff Faux recounts conversations involving CEOs who favored tax cuts
over sound industrial policies like national healthcare, even though such policies
115. Id. at 10-11.
116. Al Gore famously debated anti-trade leader Ross Perot as part of the Clinton
Administration's effort to secure Congressional approval of NAFTA. He also supported expansion of
trade with China as well as obtaining "fast track" trade negotiating authority. Globalisation Blues,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2000, at Special Briefing 8. John Kerry postured somewhat on free trade during the
election of 2004, but his votes in the senate in favor of NAFTA, in favor of normalizing trade with China,
and in favor of expanding trade with Chile and Singapore betrayed a far warmer embrace of globalization.
The Brahmin Populist, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2004, at 15.
117. The Brahmin Populist, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2004, at 15.
118. See supra note 31 & accompanying text.
119. In fact, the mainstream media treats globalization as if there is no legitimate ground for
debate regarding its contours. FAUX, supra note 7, at 158 ("Just as the discussion of economic class is
resolutely ridiculed by the national media as some looney 'conspiracy theory,' the idea of a global
governing economic class with its own interests is similarly dismissed in the echo chambers of
international punditry.").
120. Supra note 114& 117.
121. FAUX, supra note 7, at 10-11 & 158-59.
122. Ramirez, Endogenous Growth Theory, supra note 11, at 5-6.
123. DW MacKenzie, Book Review: Globalization and Its Discontents, 120 PUB. CHOICE 234,
237-38 (2004) (arguing that special interest influence over globalization should be taken as a given and
that consequently any government-based solution to the challenges of globalization should be viewed with
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124. WILLIAM i. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALIZATION, U.S. INTERVENTION,
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would boost long term corporate earnings.' 2t Most recently, CEOs seem to have
tolerated backdating options for the purpose of enhancing compensation, despite
running the risk of government investigations or even charges of fraud. 129 Thus,
CEOs are highly motivated and highly able to enhance their compensation at the
expense of long term growth.
In light of this pattern of CEO behavior and given their power over the
corporation, it seems that CEOs have the motive and the means to increase their
compensation by enhancing short term profits, notwithstanding the deleterious long
term financial consequences. This short term focus on higher salaries explains why
the structure of globalization is so focused on short term exploitation of cheap labor
at the expense of nearly all other economic considerations. Thus, our CEO primacy
system of corporate governance not only compromises the economic performance of
corporations, it has undermined the very evolution of globalization.
CONCLUSION
Globalization suffers from severe structural flaws. The legal infrastructure
governing globalization is woefully inadequate. Market fundamentalism dominates
the global economy. The current approach to globalization may prove to be more
disastrous than the laissez faire approach of the 1920s. Buying power is being
systematically destroyed, massive human capital is allowed to languish on the
margins of the global economy, and the key institutions governing the global
economy seem determined to shred legal infrastructure. The global economy has
inadequate regulatory frameworks and the those presently in place are dominated by
special interests. The market fundamentalism version of globalization seems
destined for catastrophe.
Only the pursuit of cheap labor and higher short term profitability for the
dominant transnational corporations can explain the legal structure of globalization.
The system is not ideologically driven because people are not permitted to move
freely in the so-called free global market. The structure of globalization certainly
does not reflect economic science which rejects laissez faire principles and shows the
massive creation of wealth that could occur if people could move in response to
market incentives. The system is rigged only to fatten the short term profits of U.S.
based transnational corporations.
These flaws reflect the highly problematic American corporate governance
for public corporations. CEOs do not face optimal incentives and have too much
autonomy to further their compensation at the expense of the corporation. They
consistently sacrifice long term profitability for short term profits that can enhance
their compensation. It is this corporate myopia that drives our distorted system of
corporate governance, ultimately resulting in the severe mismanagement of
globalization policy.

128. FAUX, supra note 7, at 91.
129. Supra text accompanying notes 85 to 89.
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